Mass Redistricting and Distributive Politics: Evidence from Russia’s Regions

Abstract

Redistricting is an important tool of political struggle, distinguished by several features that set it apart from other methods of creating a non-competitive electoral advantage: secrecy and non-provocativeness. These characteristics have led to significant scholarly attention, primarily focused on the political consequences of redistricting. However, the administrative and legal aspects of redistricting remain less studied, which may limit our understanding of electoral processes, especially outside the United States—the context of most existing research on the topic. Drawing on the electoral reform that took place in several Russian regions between 2019 and 2021 and was accompanied by mass redistricting, this study aims to examine the administrative and political consequences of redistricting as a legal procedure at the regional level in Russia. For this purpose, data were collected using a custom algorithm on the quality of public goods provision and the volume of their funding. Using the event study method, which allows for causal interpretation, the impact of redistricting on the quality and funding of public goods was assessed. The results indicate an increase in planned education expenditures in the year preceding elections in municipalities where at least 25 % and 50 % of precinct election commissions (PECs) did not have incumbents. The findings do not provide strong evidence of a significant impact of mass redistricting on the allocation of financial resources for publicly provided goods. However, there is moderate evidence to support the hypothesis that the reform had a positive effect on the quality of the goods provided.