Geography, Technology and Politics: Factors of Mass Protests in Russia 2011-2012
Keywords:
collective actions, mass protests in Russia, russian regionsAbstract
We develop and test a model of impact of geographical, technological and political factors on the potential of collective actions in the Russian regions. We argue that geographical factors (low population concentration across the area, cold climate) increase the costs for participating in collective actions, while the spread of telecomunication technologies partly reduces such effect. To evaluate it correctly, it is necessary to take into account authorites' readiness to repress mass actions partiticpants. To test the hypothesis, we use data on mass protests that took place in Russia after the State Duma elections in December, 2011. The results show that the factors explain from 50% to 70% of the regional mass protests scale variation.Downloads
References
Соболев А. Российская социально-политическая система: издержки коллективного действия и перспективы институциональных реформ //Проблемы политического и государственного управления в России и зарубежных странах. Москва: Изд. дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2011. С. 139-164.
Трейвиш А. Россия: население и пространство//Демоскоп Weeklу. 2003. Т. 95-96.
Туровский Р. Бремя пространства как политическая проблема России //Логос. 2005. Т. 1. С. 124-171.
Acemoglu D, Johnson S., Robinson J. A. Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth //Handbook of Economic Growth. 2005. Vol. 1. P. 385-472.
Acemoglu D, Robinson J. A. (a) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Acemoglu D, Robinson J. A. (b) De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence // American Economic Review. 2006. Vol. 96. No. 2. P. 325-330.
Alesina A., Glaeser E. L. Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference.: Oxford University Press Oxford, 2004.
Alesina A., Spolaore E. On the Number and Size of Nations //Quarterly Journal of Economics 1997. Vol. 112. No. 4. P. 1027-1056.
Arendt H. The Origins of Totalitarianism. A Harvest Book, New York 1973.
Beacháin D. Ó, Polese A. The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures. London & New York: Routledge, 2010.
Beklemisheva E. iPhone 3GS to Hit Shelves in Russia //Business Economic Reports. 2010. No. 03-01.
Bentley A. F. The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995.
Bueno de Mesquita B. The Logic of Political Survival. Boston: MIT Press, 2003.
Bueno De Mesquita B., Smith A. Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance //American Political Science Review 2010. Vol. 54. No. 4. P. 936-950.
Campante F., Do Q. A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Expected Influence Approach and Application to Population and Capital Cities //Harward Kennedy School Working Paper Series, July 2009
Campante F. R., Chor D. The People Want the Fall of the Regime: Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy //Harward Kennedy School Working Paper Series, March 2011
Campante F. R., Do Q.-A, Guimaraes B. V. Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence, 2013. Working Paper Series: w19 028. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
Collier P., Hoeffler A. Greed and Grievance in Civil War //Oxford Economic Papers. 2004. Vol. 56. No. 4. Р. 563-595.
Cox G.Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975-2004//APSA 2009. Toronto, Meeting Paper, 2009.
Dagaev D. Lamberova N., Sobolev A, Sonin K. Technological Foundations of Political Instability //2013. Centerfor Economic and Policy Research: Working Paper Series
Dahl R. A. Who Governs? Power and Democracy in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1961.
DeNardo J. Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. Princeton: University Press Princeton, 1985.
Do Q.-A., Campante F. R. Keeping Dictators Honest: The Role of Population Concentration. Research Collection School of Economics: Working Paper Series 1-2009.
Dowe D. Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform. New York: Berghahn Books, 2001.
Druker J., Maselnik I., Caloianu I., Boissevain J. Around the Bloc: Shein Starts to Eat, Blair Stumps for Kazakhstan //Transitions Online. 2012. No. 4/30.
Ekiert G., Hanson S. E. Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the legacy of Communist Rule/Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Flores A. Q., Smith A. Surviving Disasters. Manuscript: New York University. 2010.
Forges A. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch. N. Y., 1999.
Gehlbach S., Keefer P. Investment without Democracy: Ruling-party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies //Journal of Comparative Economics. 2011. Vol. 39. No. 2. Р. 123-139.
Hale B. H. The Putin Machine Sputters: First of the 2011 Duma Election Campaign // Russian Analytical Digest. 2011. No. 106. Р. 2-8.
Hill F., Gaddy C. G. The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
Hirschman A. O. The Paternity of an Index //American Economic Review. 1964. Vol. 54. No. 5. Р. 761-762.
Kangas A. Governmentalities of Big Moscow: Particularising Neoliberal Statecraft // Geopolitics. 2013. Vol. 18. No. 2. Р. 299-314.
Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M. Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008//World Bank Policy Research Working Papers 2009. No. 4978.
Kaufmann D., KraayA., Zoido-Lobatón P. Aggregating Governance Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 1999.
King G., Pan J., Roberts M. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression //American Political Science Review, 2013. Vol. 107. No. 2. Р. 326-343.
Kobak D., Shpilkin S., PshenichnikovM. S. Statistical Anomalies in 2011-2012 Russian Elections Revealed by 2D Correlation Analysis//arXiv Prepr. arXiv1205.0741.2012.
Kricheli R., Livne Y., Magaloni B. Taking to the Streets Theory and Evidence on Protests under Authoritarianism. 2011. (Unpublised manuscript)
Kriger N. J. Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Kuran T. Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution//Public Choice. 1989. Vol. 61. No. 1. Р. 41-74.
Kuran T. Now Out of Never: The Element of Eurprise in the East European Revolution of 1989//World Polit. 1991. Vol. 44. No. 1. Р. 7-48.
Lankina T. V, Getachew L. A Geographic Incremental Theory of Democratization: Territory, Aid, and Democracy in Postcommunist Regions //World Polit. 2006. Vol. 58. No.4. Р. 536-582.
Led'ayev V. Power: a Conceptual Analysis //Nova Science Publishers. N. Y, 1997.
Lindblom C. E. Politics and Markets: the World's Political Economic Systems. N. Y.: Basic Books, 1977.
Linz J. J. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Addison Wesley, 1985.
Lohmann S. The Dynamics of Informational Cascades //World Polit. 1994. Vol. 47. No.1. Р. 42-101.
McGuire M. C., Olson M. The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: the Invisible Hand and the Use of Force //Journal of Economic Literature. 1996. Vol. 34. Р. 72-96.
McMann K. M., Petrov N. V. A Survey of Democracy in Russia's Regions //American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 41. No. 3. Р. 155-182.
Mikhailova T. The Cost of the Cold. Pennsylvania State Univ., 2003.
Miner L. The Unintended Consequences of Internet Diffusion. Evidence from Malaysia, Working Paper, New Economic School. 2012.
North D. C. A Neoclassical Theory of the State //in Structure and Change in Economic History: New York: New York University Press 1986. Р. 20-32.
North D. C., Weingast B. R. Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-century England //Journal of Economic History 1989. Vol. 49. No. 4. Р. 803-832.
O'Donnell G. A. Modernization and Bureaucratic-authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley, 1973.
Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, 1965.
Olson M. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. Yale University, 1982.
Ostrom E. Collective Action Theory //Oxford Handbook of Comparative Poliltcs, 2009. Р. 186-208.
Pierskalla J. H., Hollenbach F. M. Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa//American Political Science Review. 2013. Vol. 107. No. 2. Р. 207-224.
Popkin S. L. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Univ. of California Press, 1979.
Robertson G. The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes //Managing Dissent in PostCommunist Russia. 2011.
Sigelman L., Simpson M. A Cross-National Test of the Linkage Between Economic Inequality and Political Violence //Journal of Conflict Resolution 1977. Vol. 21. No. 1. Р. 105-128.
Tiebout C. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures //J. Polit. Econ. 1956. Vol. 64. No. 5. Р. 416-424.
Tilly C. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Truman D. B. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. Knopf, 1951.
Tucker J. A. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-communist Colored Revolutions //Perspective on Politics. 2007. Vol. 5. No. 3. Р. 535.
Wintrobe R. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
How to Cite
Коды статьи
- EDN RYYYCN
- Тип статьи (РИНЦ) Научная статья (Научная статья)
