Emotions and body: the possibility of creating of we-relationship unity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22394/2074-0492-2017-3-59-81Keywords:
we-relationship, intersubjectivity, empathy, body, emotions, phenomenology, SchmitzAbstract
Within the phenomenology tradition, the attempt is made to answer the question: «How is it possible to create the unity of we-relationship". Considerations of Alfred Schutz set the line of problematization to it. According to him, we-relationship is set of separate characteristics (Me). Therefore, it is impossible to speak about complete association of the two I. The two statements are consistently proved in this article. Firstly, in the face-to-face situation, the irreducibility of the totality of the other (I) to the certain of the role function (Me) can be eliminated through an emotional state of interaction participants. Secondly, the formation of unity of We-relationship in the situation of emotional keenness is possible due to the dialogic connection between affects and bodies of participants' interaction. In the first part of the article, the conception of intersubjectivity as a premise of the formation of we-relationship is considered and its problematic gaps are determined. The conclusion is drawn, that two conceptual sources of phenomenological tradition - the empathy and the motor resonance - have a set of constraints for the full understanding of the Other. If empathy suggests a comprehension of the Other through emotional in volvement of the observer or through identification of the emotional condition of the Other by means of body expressions, then the motor resonance focuses on the body per se, on its ability to identify the Other at the level of neurons. In the second part, there is proposed to concentrate on the role of body and affects in the formation of holistic We-relationship in an interaction situation. Relying on the Hermann Schmitz new phenomenology, it is asserted that the understanding of body as a feeling substance instead of an object in the space allows to prove the formation of unity of We-relation-ship. In the final part the presented arguments are supplemented with the explication of the notion existential feelings. They act as intermediaries in the formation of bond between I and the Other.Downloads
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