Max Weber on “Freedom from Evaluation” and “Sobriety of Judgments”: From the Moral Strength of Universities to the Strength of “Personality”

Abstract

Present paper is dedicated to categories of "freedom from value judgments” and "sobriety of judgment” in Max Weber's theory. The author examines them in three contexts: as a logical principle of science, as Weber's position in university politics, and as elements of his conceptions of "personality” and "life conduct”. The author shows that the principle of "freedom” as a logical requirement is a necessary but insufficient condition for objectivity in social sciences. In actuality, it aims to separate the heterogeneous spheres of facts and practical judgments. However, an implementation of this separation in research practice cannot be realized without other elements of Weber's logical-methodological arsenal: value interpretation and nomological knowledge. At the same time, the internal structure of ideal types turns out to be insufficient to preserve the objectivity of judgments, if they turn into logically perfect, but still practical "samples”. Therefore, the demand for "freedom from value judgments" and the personal readiness of scientists to follow exclusively the values of science again becomes necessary and functionally significant. In the context of university politics, the lack of academic self-control in evaluations undermines the moral strength of educational institutions and the unity of the university system. That is why abstinence in practical evaluations becomes a tool for Weber to reassemble the construction of "academic freedom" proposed by Karl von Amira. At the same time, "freedom from value judgments" is a condition for the independence and dignity of scientists as "personalities" in science. Moreover, the lack of a "sobriety of judgment" and the inability to consciously serve the chosen matter is a threat, according to Weber, to the consistent "life conduct" of the modern person. The author concludes that the participation of a young Weber in the organization of courses in 1893 dedicated to the high-quality theoretical training of clergy can be considered as one of his first steps in posing the problems of the "sobriety of judgment" and rational "life conduct" - in this case, of scientists and the clergy. The translation of Weber's small newspaper article about the upcoming courses, presented in the present issue of "Sociology of Power", thus expands the conventional and common set of Weber's texts concerning the problems of "freedom from value judgments" and "sobriety of judgment".